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Empowering Imaginations
Greg Dening
Following is the text of a keynote address delivered at the eleventh Pacific
History Association conference at Hilo, Hawai‘i, 12 July 1996.
I have, at my age and in these circumstances, to avoid the temptation to
be nostalgic, but let me say to begin that my first teaching appointment
after leaving Harvard and my postgraduate studies was at the University
of Hawai‘i nearly thirty years ago. The Vietnam War was still on. The air-
ports everywhere, but especially on the West Coast, were full of young
men in uniform. The military presence in Hawai‘i was massive. My ap-
pointment was across both the anthropology and history departments on
the Mânoa campus. The History Department wasn’t into two-sided Pacific
history in those days. “Real history” was American, European, and per-
haps Asian. They did not know what to do with me. The Anthropology
Department, however, set me to teach first-year ethnology.
My class was made up of students of various cultural origins—Hawai-
ian, Sâmoan, Philippine, Japanese, Macao-Portuguese, Chinese, and a few
waterlogged and beached Anglo-Americans. Our textbooks came from
that Holt, Rinehart & Winston series, Case Studies in Cultural Anthro-
pology—Ian Hogbin’s Guadalcanal Society, Leopold Pospisil’s Kapauka
Papuans among them. I quickly realized that the invented and formalized
otherness of the peoples in these textbooks would provide no “ethno-
graphic moment” for any of my students. So I set them to do their own
ethnographies. I asked them to transcribe some event or ritual or drama
or experience of otherness in their lives into a narrative of some sort.
Some did their “pot” parties. Some did a wedding luau. Some did my
Sunday mass and sermon. I was stationed at the cathedral in Honolulu at
the time. Some, in fact, thought they would provide an experience of other-
ness for the bishop with whom I was staying by coming to dinner cross-
dressed—a very Polynesian thing.
I remember especially, because it was one of those cathartic moments419
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ethnography. He was a fairly reluctant reader of books. He chose as his
ethnographic moment the Sunday morning beach touch-football match at
Kâne‘ohe between local Hawaiians and the US Marines. They were vigor-
ous and violent affairs, full of subliminal hatred. I remember his excited
discovery that a touch-football match was a parable about something else
—about identity, about political domination, about macho gendering. He
then confronted with some relish the problem of how he would make the-
atre of that in an ethnography of the many meanings at different levels he
saw in the game, how he would tell his story with the plagiarism of his
learning and the inventiveness of his understanding. I felt that he had em-
powered his own imagination to discover that even the most particular
detail of living is larger than itself.
All through my academic teaching life, I have taught history of the past
by first requiring my students to do some ethnography of their present.
This has not been some presentist gimmick, not some escape from the dif-
ficulties and boredom of looking at the past, not some rejection of the
“relevance” of history. On the contrary, my students soon discovered how
difficult it was to describe their present. They soon learned that there was
nothing they observed but was the subject of reflective discourse by some-
body else. They soon discovered, as I liked to say, that if they looked at
their navel long enough all they would see would be their belly button.
They would never learn about themselves without going outside them-
selves. They soon learned that cultural living in its bare bones is talk, talk
translated into all sorts of symbols. That is its realism. We make all our
relationships by talk, all our institutions, all our roles. The theatre of our
everyday life is talk, and to be cultural survivors we need to be experts in
reading the immediate meaning of our words, but more important, what
those words really mean. To catch what Wittgenstein called the fictions of
our languaging, we need creative imagination. But that is an everyday
thing, not something for special occasions. We need creative imaginations
just to survive in a world full of sham and facade, full of “spin doctors”
and advertising agents.
All of us know that the one thing we historians never do is observe the
past. All we observe is the past transformed in some way into history. All
we ever observe are the texts made of living experience—whether these
texts are something written down in a letter or a journal, whether they
are oral traditions transcribed in some way, whether they are material
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texture, whether it is some story caught in a dance or a painting or a
tattoo, whether it is gender, power, class, wealth, poverty in the shapes
and shadows of an archaeological site. We all make history by observing
somebody else making history.
I never have recovered from the excited discovery that most of the history
that the past makes of itself comes from unpublished and unexpected
sources—from letters, journals, diaries, logs, from museums and archives,
from kitchen drawers and church basements, from palaces and hovels—
all imprinted with the tears, sweat, blood, and dust of time as much as by
ink and pencil. I have always counted it the great privilege of a historian’s
life to finger those pages, sometimes even for the first time since they were
made. Forty-five years of reading them have persuaded me that there will
never be enough years to read even the smallest fraction of the texts into
which men and women have put their lives. But I am persuaded, too, that
the historians’ impulse to saturate themselves in all that there is is the cor-
rect procedure. The webs of significance of any event, place, or person are
fine lined and faint. It takes a lot of looking to see them. And the answers
to any question that we have of them are never obvious, because the ques-
tions we ask of them are not the questions the people of the past were
asking of themselves.
If the texts of the past are mountainously high, the silences in them are
unfathomably deep: silences of pain, and of happiness, for that matter;
silences of guilt; silences of fear; silences of exclusion; silences of forget-
ting. The language of the deepest passion is often trite, bland, and with-
out apparent depth. The highest and lowest moments of human living
often have no elaboration. These are sorts of silences too. But these silences
are not likely to be an emptiness. They are more likely to be, in Paul
Valéry’s words, “the active presence of absent things.” I suppose I believe
that is what we have to empower imaginations to do: to see these absent
things, to hear these silences.
Imagination is rather unnerving for most historians. Imagination seems
to demand that they loosen their grip on the reality that makes their his-
tories different from fiction. But imagination need not be unnerving.
Imagination need not be fantasy. Imagination is the ability to see those
fine-lined and faint webs of significance. Imagination is hearing the silence
because we have heard some of the sounds. Imagination is seeing the ab-
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human solidarity, or rather imagination is an act of solidarity in our
humanness. I guess that here I am at the point of the most important
thing I feel I have to say. I would like to take it slowly.
Yes, imagination is an act of solidarity in our humanness. But there is a
dilemma in that. The humanness we share with the past is at the one time
the same and different. The most unhistorical thing we can do is to imag-
ine that the past is us in funny clothes. Our imagination has to allow us to
experience what we share with the past and see difference at the same
time. When we write history, if we are young, we have to imagine what it
is to be old; if we are old we have to imagine what it is to be young; if we
are male, we have to imagine what it is to be female, and female, male;
black, white and white, black; poor, rich and rich, poor; strong, weak and
weak, strong. Imagination is our capacity to see ourselves as somebody
else.
Ironically—and I am following the American philosopher Richard
Rorty here—our ability to see ourselves as somebody else rests on our
capacity to experience solidarity with different people as fellow sufferers,
in the broadest sense of that word suffer. Suffer is the word we use when
we quote Scripture: “Suffer little children to come unto me,” or when we
protest that we don’t “suffer fools gladly.” Suffer means to allow in some
way, to accept. When we accept different people as fellow sufferers, we
are not just accepting the pains of living. We are also accepting the limita-
tions of our human existence, accepting ourselves as we actually are. Per-
haps you have heard me say it before, to suffer ourselves is to have a
performance consciousness of ourselves as human beings.
That solidarity with different people as fellow sufferers, writes Rorty, is not
discovered by reflection but is created. It is created by increasing our sensitiv-
ity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar
sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginal-
ize people different from ourselves by thinking, “They do not feel it as we
would,” or, “There must always be suffering so why not let them suffer.” This
process of coming to see other human beings as “one of us” rather than as
“them” is a matter of detailed description of who unfamiliar people are like
and of redescription of what we ourselves are like. (Rorty 1989, xvi)
There you have it. When we empower the past by returning it to itself,
we empower our imagination to see ourselves. Our certainties are our
dialogue • dening 423greatest enemy when we approach the past. Hindsight is always blinding.
We know from our living experience that our present moment—this
moment—has all the possibilities of the future still in it. None of us pre-
scribes the reality we live in. None of us controls the consequences of our
actions. None of us can predict with absolute certainty anybody else’s
reaction to the simplest gesture, the clearest sign, the most definite word.
But we have to cope with these ambivalences, interpreting these never-
ending possibilities. Hindsight, on the other hand, reduces all possibilities
in the past to one. Hindsight leaches out not all our uncertainties, but all
the past’s uncertainties. Hindsight closes down our imagination. In hind-
sight we do not see the past as it actually was, only as it would have been
if all its uncertainties were taken away. Hindsight freezes the frame of
every picture of the past. Hindsight removes all the processes of living.
Makes the past our puppet.
Our imagination to see the past as it actually was has to return to the
past its own present, with all the possibilities of its future still in it, with
all its uncertainties, with all its inconsequentialities. Imagination restores
independence to the past by showing how partially it can be known.
Imagination humbles the author in any of us to accept what we cannot
know or cannot say.
I have to believe that we must empower our imaginations to do that in
all sorts of ways—by doing ethnographies on our living presents, by being
open to those other ethnographers of our living experience—our poets,
our novelists, our comics, our cartoonists, our filmmakers and photogra-
phers. Anuanua, Nuanua, Ânuenue—it has been said before by writers
who belong to the Pacific more than I—Nuanua, Rainbow, our creative
imagination must be Rainbow.
The humanness we share with the past is difficult enough to imagine.
The difference of the past is even more so. We cling so strongly to the
present moment as the most civilized of moments. We easily think of the
past as something grotesquely familiar. But the past is different. Make no
doubt about it. The past is different. The privilege we feel in being male
or female, young or old, black or white, powerful or weak is only toward
those of our living political present. The past is much farther off and
nobody gets there but by giving a little. No one catches the reality of the
past but by giving some deference to it. That deference is part of the
empowering imagination.
I suppose that is one reason I have always been attracted to the beach-
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people of the diaspora as we have come to call them in this conference.
There is one thing about the people of the diaspora that joins them
together, whatever way they cross the beach. They are always translators
of some sort. They are always transforming the languaging of one sort of
living into another. They always begin their translation with some defer-
ence to the cultural realism of the other. That deference is not necessarily
an act of sympathy or affection, not necessarily an act of approval. They
don’t have to like what they see, or think it better or right. All sorts of
motivations move that deference. But the deference is in essence an act of
understanding, no matter how dim, of the metaphoric nature of reality.
The deference catches the interconnectedness of things in the other cul-
ture. It becomes an entry point into other ways of seeing things. That
realization of difference in others is always in some ways a transforma-
tion of self, not necessarily a denial of self, more usually an enlarging of
self, a realization of the potentialities of self. There is no discontinuity in
that. Nothing cultural has died in that. On the contrary, life has been
extended in that.
Translation is always a transformation. Translation is always an act of
imagination. Ortega y Gasset once said something about translation that I
think is pertinent to what I am trying to say:
That stupendous reality that is language cannot be understood unless we
begin by observing that speech consists above all in silences. A being who
could not renounce saying many things would be incapable of speaking. And
each language represents a different equation between manifestations and
silences. Each people leaves some things unsaid in order to be able to say others.
Because everything would be unsayable. Hence the immense difficulty in
translation: translation is a matter of saying in a language precisely what that
language tends to pass over in silence. (Quoted in Becker 1995, 6)
I have never felt that the response of island peoples to changes put
upon them by empire, mission, and trade was something less than
creative aboriginality. Their translations were never a denial of self. They
were empowered by an imagination that filled the silences of their own
language. I suspect that is the same for us. When we translate the differ-
ences of the past in our histories, we empower our imagination to hear
the silences in our own language.
I was there, with others here this evening, in the Clare Valley, South
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As I remember it, there were two principal debates at that foundation
meeting. The one was whether we would call ourselves a Pacific Studies
or a Pacific History Association. The other was how we would ensure
that no one national, cultural, or institutional interest would dominate
the association.
I suppose that by natural inclination I might have been thought to
favor a Pacific Studies Association. All my academic life I have been pre-
occupied with the effect of beaches and boundaries. All my academic life I
have decried polarities of every sort. I have said it often enough. It is my
ultimate liberal conviction. All polarities are fraud. If there is a secret of
life, it is that living is always something in between. All my academic life,
in that sense, has been postmodern. Not postmodernist: not a theory of
literary criticism. Postmodern, an era of global experience. There is no
one here who is not postmodern. Postmodernity is the discovery that
modernity has been a false prophet. Modernity has not saved us from two
world wars, or a holocaust, or Bosnia, or Rwanda. Modernity has not
saved us from our racist and greedy selves. There is nobody here who has
not been affected by Picasso or Stravinsky or Wittgenstein. There is
nobody here who has not been affected by Franz Fanon. We are all
plagiarists of our own past. There is not an idea in our heads that has not
been shaped in some way by the events and understandings of the twen-
tieth century and the centuries before.
Modernity flowed out of the great movement in human culture that we
have come to call the Enlightenment. “The enlightened,” Immanuel Kant
declared, “dared to know” (1973, 384). The gamble most took in daring
to know was to take a perspective on the world and human nature, to see
something partially so that they could see more deeply, to blinker them-
selves so that they saw the world differently from everyday experience.
They would see the world scientifically, in the broadest sense of that
word. They saw geological strata as time, radio waves as stars, lines on
screens as neutrons. They saw genes, cell structures, ids and egos, supply
and demand, highs and lows. It takes a lot of social energy and a lot of
politics to see the world in these blinkered ways. But these blinkered
visions become dangerous when their partial view is thought to be whole.
My postmodernity, as I see it, has always been a struggle against any
claim that any blinkered perception, whether it be theological, genetical,
economical, psychological—a struggle against the claim that any blink-
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allow it to see what others don’t.
That’s why I agreed totally to calling ourselves the Pacific History
Association. The grace of history is that it is a humanity. It is the great
unblinkered science. History is scientific in all ways save one. It is not
exclusive of any perspective or any understanding. History has demands
of accuracy and exhaustiveness. It demands that if we say something,
anything, about the past, that anybody else seeing the same thing could
say the same thing. It demands that insofar as we can delineate it, we
reveal our own persons in our work, not just our biases, but those things
that affect us in our reading and writing. It demands that we seek the
truth. But it also demands that we should be open to being surprised at
what that truth is. And that truth that we discover in history has the same
qualities with which we experience truth in everyday life—sometimes
uncertainly, sometimes contradictorily, sometimes clouded by the forces
that drive us to it, sometimes so clearly that it blinds us to its untruth.
History is a humanity. History is a nonexclusive art. There is no part of
human endeavor that is not the object of history’s inquiry. There is no
way of understanding that is not its tool. That, to me, is a very special
quality. But there is more.
That term history in our title, Pacific History Association, is much
broader in concept than the term that describes what brings us together,
the Pacific. Maybe I would have preferred that we called ourselves the
Pacific Histories Association to indicate the varied ways we represent the
past. We dance our histories, we paint them, sing them, picture them, film
them, mime them, as well as write them. Our histories have as many vari-
eties as there are dimensions of living. But by describing ourselves as an
association of histories, we do something more than show patience with
our diversity of histories. We make ourselves open to discoveries that are
global as well as regional. Our ears become open to many conversations
around the world. Who among us has not had our imagination empow-
ered by what Franz Fanon wrote in The Wretched of the Earth, or E P
Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class, or Oscar Lewis
in The Children of Sanchez? Who among us has not had our imagination
empowered by subaltern studies, by gender studies, by Edward Said’s
Orientalism?
We know that when we hear these voices, we don’t clone them. We
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we use them to enlarge our way of seeing. We make them groan and pro-
test, Michel Foucault once said (1975, 33). It is not our point to be faith-
ful to them. We are in conversation with them. That makes our history
global, if not in topic, then in discourse.
It is the history in the title of our Pacific History Association that
empowers our imagination. That history is never frozen still. It is always
in flux. It is now. It always has been. A long time ago I was one of the
prize undergraduate students in history at the University of Melbourne.
The trouble was that I did not want to do what was considered to be
“real history” at the time—British history, Renaissance history, Medieval
history. I wanted to do what we thought of as the two-sided history
between the island peoples of Oceania and the strangers who came to
dominate them. To do that I thought I needed skills other than those that
history to that time had given me. I thought the skills I needed were
anthropological. I did not know what anthropological meant, but I knew
I did not want to do the history of the “civilized” and the anthropology
of the “uncivilized.” I wanted to do the history and the anthropology, the
anthro-history if you like, of both the island peoples and the intruding
strangers. My professor, when I went to see him to tell him I was going to
Harvard to study anthropology the better to write the sort of history I
wanted to do, said, “Dening, this is the end of your academic career.” It
wasn’t, as it turned out. But for years we tried to find a name for the spe-
cial sort of history we thought we were doing. We called it “ethnohis-
tory,” “culture contact,” “zero-point history.” But each of those terms
became unsatisfactory as we began to use them and delved into their rami-
fications. “Ethnohistory” seemed to indicate that we were doing a lesser
sort of history. “Cultures” did not come in contact. “Zero-point” con-
ceived as the true culture that was All Time Before was a denigration of
all that came after. It was a denial of creative aboriginality and a denial of
cultural continuities. But the discovery of these words’ limitations was
not instant. It was a discovery in discourse. It was discovered in under-
graduate essays, in PhD theses, in learned articles, in constant debate and
conversations. It was a discovery that every insight is fleeting, that the
instant interests and politics close down a discipline, imagination will
open it.
There is a story I have often told. Forgive me if you have heard it. I
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beginning of my academic life, and I told it at the end. I doubt that I will
have the honor and privilege of speaking to the Pacific History Associa-
tion in assembly again. I have to wonder even whether I will be back in
Hawai‘i again. So be patient with me.
Fifty years ago my postschooling education was begun in a seminary.
Offices and duties were distributed in a seminary less with an eye to talent
than with an eye for the good of one’s soul. One year I was appointed
Magister Equi, Master of the Horse. The horse’s name was Eustace. He
was an enormous brute with great rolling haunches and a huge belly
inflatable at any given point to frustrate tight girths. City born, I was
innocent of any real knowledge of horses. I thought they all knew some
sort of farmland patois like “Whoa,” or “Giddap.” Eustace only knew
violence. He had come to the seminary from timber haulers in the moun-
tains. He was trained to give of himself instantly and totally, which was
good for logs but bad for mowers and ploughs. One of the tasks of the
Master of the Horse was to plough the orchard. My image of ploughing
had come mainly from the Dutch masters. I saw it as a serenely medita-
tive occupation, tripping over occasional larks, lunching on bread and
wine at the noon Angelus. I discovered that ploughs are heavy, unmanage-
able things. They required two hands just to hold them upright. Where, I
asked, did the reins go? They went around one’s neck, I was told. With
Eustace steaming into the middle distance of the orchard, one had a poor
choice. Pursue him at a break-neck pace with the plough, or break one’s
neck by dropping the plough. It was then, I think, that my skepticism for
sacred Scripture began. It sometimes takes more courage to take one’s
hand off the plough than to keep it on.
Of course, the more imagination you have, the more courage you
will need, either to hold on or take your hands off the plough. So be
warned. The more your imagination is empowered, the more you
empower the past with your imagination, the more troubles you can
expect. But remember what Albert Wendt said in his poem “Walls”
(1995, 324):
Walls frame our seeing
Walls don’t happen
We grow them.
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